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Introduction
In the early morning hours of December 24, .1978, John Starling,
inebriated to the point of unconsciousness, rolled off a commercial fish-
ing pier into the surrounding waters and drowned. His estate sued the
pier for negligence because the pier employee failed to provide for
John's safety after knowing of his drunken condition. This case com-
ment explores the issues raised by Estate of Starling v. Fisherman's
Pier1 as they pertain to the duty owed by owners of commercial prem-
ises to invitees who become incapacitated and then injured. This com-
ment also examines Florida courts' position in the area of premises lia-
bility2 and analyzes traditional classifications of visitors with the
concurrent duties and immunities these classifications confer upon
premises owners and occupiers.
While not emphasizing the distinctions, Estate of Starling exem-
plifies the outmoded distinctions between certain classes of visitor
plaintiffs. Plaintiff classification is often the critical element in deter-
mining landowner liability; thus this comment considers the different
results courts can reach depending on plaintiff classification. Finally,
since classification is frequently unjust and anachronistic in contempo-
rary society, this comment advocates its replacement with a single duty
of reasonable care in view of foreseeability of injuries to others.
Estate of Starling
On December 24, 1978, John Starling decided to walk out onto
1. Estate of Starling v. Fisherman's Pier, Inc., 401 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 411 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1981).
2. The Starling court did not elaborate on the distinctions between classifications
of persons who come upon property. John Starling was classified as an invitee without
any discussion. This case comment will expand the court's analysis and illustrate how
different results may follow depending on the initial classification.
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the fishing pier located off the City of Lauderdale-by-the-Sea. Perhaps
John wanted to see whether the fish were biting or perhaps he wanted
to "toast in" Christmas eve while out on the pier as he carried a bottle
of liquor with him through the entrance pay booth. The pier employee
and operator of the bait shop, August Poehler, apparently also wanted
to join in the celebration. John and August partook in the drinking of
the holiday spirits while in the bait shop.8 John, however, proceeded to
get thoroughly drunk and stumbled back out onto the pier where he
subsequently passed out near the pier's edge.
August failed to take any precautions to safeguard his unconscious
customer. Later, John Starling rolled off the fishing pier into the sur-
rounding ocean waters and drowned. 4 His estate sued the pier owner
and August Poehler because as pier employee, August failed to take
precautionary steps to provide for John's safety after seeing John in a
drunken condition.
The Lower Court
Starling's estate claimed the pier was negligent in failing to re-
move Starling from a position of known danger when he could have
been easily removed by the pier employee without any danger to that
employee.
In defense, the pier relied principally on Reed v. Black Caesar's
Forge Gourmet Restaurant, Inc.,5 which involved an intoxicated res-
taurant patron who recovered his keys from the valet parldng attendant
and proceeded to drive his car into Biscayne Bay where he drowned.
Florida's Third District Court of Appeal found no restaurant liability
because the proximate cause of Reed's death was his own negligence in
driving while intoxicated. Thus, the owners of the fishing pier in Star-
ling argued the proximate cause of decedent's death was his own negli-
gence in becoming intoxicated.
To bolster its defense, the fishing pier proprietors in Starling ar-
gued that the liquor the deceased consumed was not sold or supplied by
the pier.' Since Florida does not have a Dram Shop Act, a bar is under
3. Brief for Appellants at 2.
4. Id.
5. 165 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
6. Brief for Appellee at 5-6. The plaintiff in Starling cited a case in which a
1 536 6:1982 1Nova Law Journal
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no duty to protect an intoxicated person from injury to himself.7 There-
fore, defendant contended, a fishing pier that did not serve alcoholic
beverages would be under even less of a duty than a bar that supplied
its patrons with intoxicating liquors.8 Additionally, argued the pier,
neither the condition of the premises presented a danger nor did any
act of the pier operator place Starling in a perilous situation.9 Had de-
fendant not kept the premises in a safe condition, or failed to warn
plaintiff of a hidden peril which defendant knew or should have known
about, the breach of duty would have been clear.10
The only duty the pier recognized was the duty of a business es-
tablishment to protect its patrons from harm by other patrons or em-
ployees, when notice of a specified danger was apparent.", This duty
arguably does not extend to a duty to protect a guest from himself.
Generally, there is no duty "to come to the assistance of a person who
is so ill or intoxicated as to be unable to look out for himself. '12 The
Broward County Circuit Court, persuaded by the defendants' argument
and reliance on Reed, dismissed the Starling estate complaint with
prejudice for failure to state a cause of action. s
plaintiff was struck by an automobile after being ejected from a bar because he was
intoxicated. One basis for liability was the violation of a statute prohibiting a bar from
serving or selling liquor to an intoxicated person. Pence v. Ketchum, 326 So. 2d 831
(La. 1976).
7. Florida, along with more than half the states, does not have a Dram Shop Act.
4D PERSONAL INJURY AcTIONS, DEFENSES, DAMAGES § 1.02 (L. Frummer & M.
Friedman eds. 1971). Such statutes impose liability on one who dispenses liquor to an
already intoxicated person and are designed to protect, not the intoxicated person, but
innocent bystanders who are injured by him. The primary purpose of the act is to
protect the "economic, social and moral well-being and the safety of the state and all
its people," Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 143 P.2d 952 (3d Dist. Ct. App.
1943).
8. Brief for Appellee at 6.
9. Id. at 4. The defendant relied on the fact the open horizontal railing, in and of
itself, presented no danger. He ignored the fact that it was this condition that became
dangerous by being insufficient to prevent the victim from rolling off the pier.
10. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63 (1966).
11. Brief for Appellee at 2 (citing Warner v. Florida Jai Alai, Inc., 221 So. 2d
777 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969)).
12. Brief for Appellee at 203 (citing 57 AM. JUR. 2d Negligence § 41 at 389
(1971)).
13. Brief for Appellants at 3 (citing to the record at 33).
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The Appellate Decision
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the Broward
County Circuit Court's dismissal of Starling estate's complaint. The
appellate court recognized the general rule that a chance bystander has
no duty to come to the aid of an intoxicated person. However, the busi-
ness relationship existing between the pier and the invited patron pro-
vided the necessary relationship in order to impose an ordinary duty of
care.14 Accordingly, if the facts of Reed were altered, the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal probably would have held the restaurant liable.
The Fourth District hypothesized that, if in Reed the restaurant had
knowledge that an unconscious patron was left unattended in the res-
taurant parking lot and injury resulted, restaurant liability probably
would lie. In other words, the Starling court implicitly recognized that
both knowledge of the patron's incapacity coupled with control over the
patron's actions are the requisite elements to find premise owner liabil-
ity for injuries sustained by the patron.
A case factually similar to Starling aided the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in the duty of care analysis, and the court looked to
the West Virginia's Supreme Court of Appeals decision in Hovermale
v. Berkeley Springs Moose Lodge No. 1483.15 In Hovermale, a Moose
Lodge member was found dead in his car after drinking at the lodge
bar the previous night. Whether the victim was ill or drunk was dis-
puted at the trial. The evidence did show after a few drinks Hovermale
collapsed at the bar and was taken to his car at the direction of the
bartender in order to "sleep it off."16 When the lodge closed for the
night no one checked the condition of the victim "asleep" in his car.
When the lodge re-opened the next morning, Hovermale was found
dead. He had suffered a heart attack within hours after being placed in
his automobile.
The West Virginia court, relying on the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, found the lodge owed Hovermale an ordinary duty of care:
[A] possessor of lands open to the public is under a duty to those
members of the public who enter in response to its invitation to
14. 401 So. 2d. 1136.
15. 271 S.E.2d 335 (W. Va. 1980).
16. Id. at 337.
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give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they
are ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for
by others.1
Thus the supreme court considered whether under the circum-
stances defendant complied with its duty to render aid to an invitee
known to be ill or injured and whether this factual question had been
improperly taken from the jury. Finding that it had, the supreme court
of appeals reversed the Morgan County Circuit Court and awarded a
new trial.18
Starling and Hovermale may be distinguished to the extent that
the plaintiffs' incapacities resulted from different causes.1 9 The Starling
court said, however, that regardless of the initial reason for the disabil-
ity, the end result - total incapacity - was the same. Liability to the
business depends on the proprietor's knowledge of the victim's condi-
tion, the foreseeability of danger, and the ability to render aid to the
intoxicated patron.
A proprietor simply cannot ignore and step over an unconscious
customer lying in a dangerous place upon his premises and he must
take some minimal steps to safeguard any customer upon his prem-
ises from extreme danger, even though the customer has allowed
himself to be exposed to that danger in the first place. 20
Intoxication Issue
In Starling,1 Chief Judge Letts stated that gross misconduct on
the part of the decedent might affect the case's outcome: "[W]e would
expect that a jury would find the drowned man comparatively negligent
17. Id. at 338 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 314A (1965)).
18. Id.
19. See supra text accompanying note 16.
20. 401 So. 2d 1136. On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Fisherman's Pier
alleged a conflict between the Reed and Starling decisions. In Reed, a commercial
establishment was under no duty to protect an intoxicated person from harm to him-
self, while in Starling, an affirmative duty was imposed. Brief for Petitioner at 2. The
Florida Supreme Court denied certiorari based on jurisdictional grounds. Starling, 411
So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1981).
21. 401 So. 2d 1136.
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in large or even total measure ... 22 However, the Chief Judge also
stated the issue of comparative negligence was not the test of whether a
cause of action was stated.2
Prior to 1973, Florida followed the common law rule that any con-
tribution by a plaintiff to his own injury, would totally bar the plaintiff
from recovery, even though the defendant was clearly more at fault.
However, with Hoffman v. Jones2 4 Florida adopted the law of compar-
ative negligence which does not completely bar the negligent plaintiff's
recovery but rather reduces it in proportion to the plaintiff's own con-
tributory negligence. Florida's abrogation of the contributory negli-
gence doctrine caused considerable modification in the assumption of
risk defense as well. "Assumption of the risk in certain instances
merges with comparative negligence . . . [and] the fact finder is enti-
tled to consider all facts and circumstances in order to determine the
extent to which the plaintiff may be at fault. ' 25 Still the standard of
care for intoxicated plaintiffs is the same: that of sober individuals.28
Therefore, because comparative negligence is not a total bar to recov-
ery, a cause of action could exist for Starling's estate.
The issue of plaintiff's intoxication at the time of injury is properly
a matter for the jury's consideration. 27 A jury might well deny recov-
ery; however, plaintiff's incapacity precipitates a duty of care upon the
defendant proprietor. "The evidence of intoxication goes to the jury
question of whether [the defendant] should have known, in the exercise
of reasonable care, that the deceased was in need of attention."'2 ,
Total incapacity of a plaintiff renders a duty on the proprietor to
take precautions to guard the plaintiff's safety.2 9 Despite the fact that
the plaintiff was initially negligent in becoming drunk, once he is in a
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
25. Hall v. Holton, 330 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) quoted in Heath
v. First Baptist Church, 341 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
26. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed.
1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283, comment d (1965).
27. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Houston, 209 Ark. 217, 189 S.W.2d
904 (1945); Mills v. Silbernagel & Co., 204 Ark. 734, 164 S.W.2d 893 (1942); Sand-
ers v. Brown, 73 Ariz. 116, 238 P.2d 941 (1952).
28. 140 So. 2d 702 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
29. Small v. Boston & Me. R.R., 85 N.H. 330, 159 A. 298 (1932).
1540 Nova Law Journal 6:19821
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drunken stupor the law recognizes the impossibility of requiring sober
conduct.30 Therefore, the question for the jury to decide was whether a
breach of duty occurred under the circumstances. While it is true that
a proprietor "is not an insurer and as such should not be held responsi-
ble for events over which he has no control and could not reasonably
foresee,"8 1 in a particular situation a jury might well decide what ac-
tions a reasonable person would be expected to take.32 For instance, the
pier proprietor in Starling knew the victim had passed out and was
situated in a dangerous position. How far one must go to protect a
person from injury depends on the foreseeability of injury, the plain-
tiff's capacity to watch out for his own safety, and what a reasonable
person would do under the circumstances.
There are other special situations in which a higher duty of care
may be imposed. For example, one charged with the custody of an-
other, such as a police officer in a police-prisoner situation,3 3 or a com-
mon carrier in service of a passenger," has been held to a higher than
ordinary duty of care.35 Thus where an intoxicated prisoner was injured
after a fall from his bunk bed, the jailer was found liable for failing to
secure the plaintiff to prevent a foreseeable injury."6 Putting a passen-
ger off a train in the middle of the night when the passenger was so
30. Id.
31. 271 S.E.2d at 339.
32. The Hovermale court cited a case where a train conductor failed to render
aid to a passenger suffering from a stroke, assuming that the man was drunk, and
stated:
[t]he case turns, not on what the conductor assumed or thought, but on
what he should, in the exercise of reasonable prudence, have done in light
of the facts which were brought to his notice .... The fault of the con-
ductor was not in making the wrong diagnosis, but in rashly assuming that
he was competent to make any diagnosis at all.
Middle v. Whitridge, 213 N.Y. 499 at ., 108 N.E. 192 at 197 (1915) quoted in
Hovermaleo 271 S.E.2d at 339.
33. Barlow v. City of New Orleans, 228 So. 2d 47 (La. Ct. App. 1969); Shuff v.
Zurich-Am. Ins. Co., 173 So. 2d 392 (La. Ct. App. 1965); Wilson v. City of Kotzebue,
627 P.2d 623 (Alaska 1981).
34. Swilley v. Economy Cab Co. of Jacksonville, 46 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1950).
35. Barlow v. City of New Orleans, 228 So. 2d 47 (La. Ct. App. 1969); Swilley
v. Economy Cab Co. of Jacksonville, 46 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1950); Bourgeois v. Toye
Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 192 So. 379 (La. Ct. App. 1939).
36. Shuff v. Zurich-Am. Ins. Co., 173 So. 2d 392 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
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intoxicated as to be totally unaware of any danger was found to be a
breach of duty owed by the train to its passenger.37 One "whose mental
and physical facilities are so impaired, that he is incapable of exercis-
ing due care for himself, where he is in the custody of another who is
charged with the duty of caring for his safety, ' 38 should not be sub-
jected to rules of contributory or comparative negligence. Alternatively,
where a plaintiff-prisoner was found not so drunk to be unable to pro-
tect himself, the burden on the defendant was correspondingly lighter
and no breach of duty was found.39
The degree of plaintiff's incapacity determines whether a higher
degree of care will be imposed in a custodial relationship. The "degree
of vigilance and caution which is necessary . . . may vary according to
the capacity of the person with respect to whom the duty to exercise
care exists."'40 Total incapacity, as in the Starling case, logically would
require more care than that required toward one who was only slightly
drunk. When the defendant knows of the plaintiff's incapacity and then
allows the plaintiff to expose himself to great peril, the defendant has
committed a culpable act.41
Intoxication of a person does not relieve others of the obligation to
exercise care to avoid injuring him, but may, on the contrary, im-
pose a duty of exercising greater care than would otherwise be suf-
ficient, where his appearance and actions indicate such a degree of
37. Johnson v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 104 Ala. 241, __, 16 So. 75, 77
(1894). In that case, the conductor ejected a drunk passenger in the middle of the
tracks for not having the fare. See also Pence, 326 So. 2d 831. An additional basis for
recovery in Pence was founded on the defendant's duty to avoid affirmative acts which
increase the peril to an intoxicated patron. The Pence court stated:
If it should be conceded that [plaintiff] contributed to his death by drink-
ing until he became drunk and unconscious, it would not follow that the
plaintiff would not be entitled to recover. If a person lies down upon a
railroad track in a state of helpless intoxication, the company will not be
justified in running a train over him, if it can be avoided in the exercise of
reasonable care, after the person is discovered in his exposed condition.
Id. at 837 (quoting Weymire v. Wolfe, 52 Iowa 533, 3 N.W. 541, 542 (1879)).
38. Wilson, 627 P.2d at 631.
39. Manuel v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 140 So. 2d 702 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
40. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 12 at 587 (1956). See generally 58 AM. JUR. 2d
Negligence § 39 (1971).
41. Johnson v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 104 Ala. 241, 16 So. 2d 75 (1894).
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intoxication as affects his capacity to care for his own safety."'
Liability to Trespassers, Licensees and Invitees
In his often-quoted concurring opinion from Heaven v. Pender,"3
Master of the Rolls Brett stated the basic negligence principle:
[W]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a posi-
tion with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who
did think would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary
care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circum-
stances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property
of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid
such danger.4
Premises liability, which departs in some respects from this principle,
deals with the liability of owners or occupiers of real property to in-
jured visitors or guests.4 5
The status of the injured person, as invitee, licensee or trespasser,
"affects to some degree the liability of the owner . . . since it may
determine the extent of the obligation which the duty of due care im-
poses upon the possessor."'4 6 It is this status factor which distinguishes
such cases from other negligence actions.
The special rules of premise liability are frequently said to be at-
tributed to the special place in which land has historically "been held
in English and American thought, the dominance and prestige of the
landowning class in England during the formative period of the rules
governing the possessor's liability, and the heritage of feudalism. 4 7
Traditionally, persons entering the premises of another have been
42. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 12 at 587 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
43. 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509 (1883).
44. Id. as quoted in Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 180, 183, 443 P.2d 561,
564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968).
45. 62 AM. JUR. 2d Premises Liability § 215 at 226 (1971).
46. Id.
47. 69 Cal. 2d 180, 184, 443 P.2d 561, 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1968). The
Rowland court refers to 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS at 1432 (1956).
For discussion of the origins and history of premises liability, see W. L. PROSSER, Busi-
ness Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REv. 573 (1942). See also Comment, The
Outmoded Distinction Between Licensees and Invitees, 22 Mo. L. REV. 186 (1957).
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divided into three categories: trespassers, licensees, and invitees. Each
has commanded a different degree of care due from the owner or per-
son in control of the premises. For example, a landowner owes the least
duty to a trespasser. The landowner must warn of known dangers once
he knows of the trespasser's presence, and must refrain from wantonly
injuring the trespasser. A landowner owes the greatest duty to invitees.
He must inspect the premises for unsafe conditions and repair any de-
fects which are known or should be known,48 "and . . give timely
notice of latent or concealed perils . . . not known to the [invitee]."4
The duty owed to a licensee, one on the property for social purposes,
falls somewhere between the duties owed to invitee and trespasser.
At times difficulties in classifying persons on others' property has
led to confusion where premises owner liability has been at issue. Tres-
passers enter the land without the landowner's permission, licensees are
tolerated, and invitees are desired or even asked to enter the premises
for business purposes. 50 However, licensees may be designated as gratu-
itous, bare, or "mere" licensees.51 In an increasing tendency to find lia-
bility where none might otherwise exist, the courts have sometimes
strained to include certain visitors 52 in one category rather than
another.
Typical of the difficulties in this classification system is the conflict
of opinion over the definition of "invitee." One basis for invitee status
rests upon an economic benefit theory.53 The price for the economic
48. PROSSER, supra note 26, at 357.
49. Waterman v. Graham, 228 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969) quoted
in Heath v. First Baptist Church, 341 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
50. Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 996 (1964).
51. 62 AM. JUR. 2d Premises Liability § 74 at 328. For further discussion of
Florida's treatment of classifications of visitors upon the premises, see text at pp. 545-
47 infra.
52. "While it has been said often enough that 'mutuality of interest' may be
indirect and remote from the object of the particular visit, there is at least ground for
suspecting that in some of these cases, at least, it has been dredged up for the occa-
sion." PROSSER, supra note 22, at 388. See, e.g., Cameron v. Abatiell, 127 Vt. 111, 241
A.2d 310 (1968), holding a policeman on duty to be an invitee, rather than a licensee,
and thus allowing recovery.
53. One authority discusses nineteenth century English contract law as one of the
origins of premises liability. Comment, supra note 47, at 188. Other areas of the law
which have been drawn upon and at times confounded by the then newly emerging
10
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benefit derived from the visitor's presence is the landowner's duty to
make the premises safe.' When there is no benefit to the landowner,
generally, he is under no duty. Exactly what constitutes an economic
benefit can also become a complex determination. Professor Prosser
stated that economic benefit may take the form of good will, like
merely making a public restroom available. 5 Other courts have found
economic benefit as the possibility of future sales to an accompanying
friend of a patron.56 Some cases have applied merely a public invitation
test.5 7 There is an implied representation that one who holds his prem-
ises open to the public is presumed to have made them safe, 8 whether
an economic benefit is involved or not.
Without much discussion Florida's Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal in Starling classified Starling as an invitee. Presumably defen-
dants could have argued that because Starling used the premises for
drinking, a purpose not held out to the public, Starling lost his invitee
status. Moreover, the pier could also have argued that by drinking
Starling violated a local ordinance and therefore lost his invitee sta-
tus. 59 Then the question would be whether Starling was a licensee or a
trespasser and what effect this would have on the duty of the pier oper-
ator. Conceivably, defendant's duty might be diminished if Starling
was classified a trespasser.
In Florida prior to 1972, a licensee was one who entered the prem-
ises for his own benefit, with the permission of the landowner. In Post
v. Lunney," Florida's mutual benefit test or economic benefit test for
determining invitee status was replaced with the broader invitation test
principles of negligence include: the law of nuisance on the highway, the law of fraud,
and the distinction between acts of omission and commission.
54. PROSSER, supra note 26 at 386, (citing FIRST RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§
332, 343, Comment a (1938)).
55. PROSSER, supra note 26, at 388.
56. Id.
57. Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 996 (1964).
58. PROSSER, supra note 26 at 388.
59. The Chief Judge noted, but did not specifically address, the fact that the
consumption of alcoholic beverages on the pier was in violation of a municipal ordi-
nance. He also observed in a footnote that the pier operator had consumed alcoholic
beverages with the drowned man. 401 So. 2d 1136.
60. 261 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1972).
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found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332.1 This test qualified
business invitees, public invitees, and social guests for the same degree
of care from the landowner. The unjust results of the mutual benefit
test were clearly illustrated by Post v. Lunney where Mrs. Lunney
while on a garden club tour tripped on a piece of transparent vinyl
protecting an oriental rug and sustained injury. Mrs. Lunney sued Mrs.
Post, the owner of the home, who had offered her home to the tour for
charitable purposes. Mrs. Post received no compensation for allowing
the tour of her estate, though Mrs. Lunney had paid to go on the tour.
Mrs. Lunney was in the home with Mrs. Post's permission but there
was no business relationship between them and thus no invitee status.
The trial court denied recovery but the Florida Fourth District Court
of Appeal reversed holding the instruction to the jury, that plaintiff was
a licensee, was incorrect. She was an invitee and should be allowed to
recover. The plaintiff could have reasonably assumed she was an invitee
and would be under the Restatement test.6 2 Public invitees and busi-
ness invitees were found preferable to the exclusive use of the mutual
benefit test formerly stated in McNulty v. Hurley.3
Even though the class of business invitees was enlarged to include
public invitees without the requirement of an economic benefit, in
Wood v. Camp6 4 the Florida Supreme Court confirmed its commitment
to retain different degrees of care depending on the status of the plain-
tiff. The Wood case involved a father's action against a landowner for
his child's death when a bomb shelter which the child had entered ex-
ploded. The child was an invited guest. At issue was the inclusiveness
of the class of invitees and the appropriate standard of care. By revolv-
ing the distinction around the invitation, whether express or implied,
61. Id. at 148.
62. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 defines invitee:
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on the
land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held
open to the public.
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land
for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealing with
the possessor of land.
Id. at 176.
63. 97 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1957).
64. 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973).
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the supreme court expanded the group of invitees to include licensees
and social guests applying to both a single standard of responsible care
under the circumstances. But the Florida Supreme Court specifically
retained the class of uninvited licensee and trespasser, although it ad-
mitted there is only a fine distinction between these latter two catego-
ries."5 Wood then overruled Cochran v. Abercrombie66 which had disal-
lowed recovery for a licensee to whom there was only a duty not to
purposely injure. 67
, Argument for Elimination of Categories
While a person's status may be relevant in predicting the foresee-
ability of his presence, once his presence is known reasonable burdens
upon the landowner vary with the circumstances.
Thus, although the foreseeability of harm to an invitee would ordi-
narily seem greater than the foreseeability of harm to a trespasser,
in a particular case the opposite may be true. The same may be
said of the issue of certainty of injury. The burden to the defendant
and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach may often be greater with
respect to the trespassers than with respect to invitees, but it by no
means follows that this is true in every case. In many situations,
the burden will be the same, i.e. the conduct necessary upon the
defendant's part to meet the burden of exercising due care as to
invitees will also meet his burden with respect to licensees and
trespassers.6 8
The Wood court's main criticisms of abolishing the distinction are
that once abolished, no guidelines can be offered to a jury, and the
landowner would be subjected to too great a burden, making him an
insurer of those who come upon his premises.6 9 But a reasonable guide-
65. Id. at 695.
66. 118 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
67. In Cochran, a case with facts strikingly similar to the Wood case, plaintiff
was looking at the car motor upon defendant's request. When defendant started the
car, which had been left in gear, plaintiff was injured. 118 So. 2d 636.
68. 69 Cal. 2d 180, 186, 443 P.2d 561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1968).
69. 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973).
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line for a jury is that a defendant will only be held liable in those situa-
tions where a "reasonable [person] would have realized plaintiff's grave
danger, and lack of danger to himself, and where reasonably effective
means of rescue were easily accessible as defendant knew or should
have known .... "o70 If this reasoning were applied to the Starling
case, regardless of how the decedent was classified, liability would lie.
But if the status distinctions -were retained and Starling had been clas-
sified a trespasser, perhaps because he went beyond the scope of his
invitation, then liability might not lie, even though all other factors
have remained constant.
A major problem with retaining different degrees of care is that at
times an individual's status might change during the course of a single
visit. That is, an invitee might become a licensee or trespasser because
of changes in the reason for his visit, the scope of this invitation,7 1 the
particular location of the premises where the injury occurred, or even
the length of his stay.72 A good example of this status inconsistency is
illustrated by the following fact pattern:
A canvasser who comes on your premises without your consent is a
trespasser. Once he has your consent, he is a licensee. Not until
you do business with him is he an invitee. Even when you have
done business with him, it seems rather strange that your duty to-
ward him should be different when he comes to your door from
what it is when he goes away. Does he change his color in the
middle of the conversation? What is the position when you discuss
business with him and it comes to nothing? No confident answer
can be given to these questions. Such is the morass into which the
law has floundered in trying to distinguish between licensees and
invitees.73
In Starling, even though the plaintiff was not specifically invited to
the pier to drink, and even if he stayed on the pier after closing hours,
70. Fowler V. Harper and Fleming James, Jr., 2 THE LAW OF TORTs, § 18.6 at
1046 (1956), (citing J. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 112-13 (1908)).
71. Robillard v. Tillotson, 118 Vt. 295, 108 A.2d 524 (1954).
72. Hickman v. First Nat'l Bank of Great Falls, 112 Mont. 398, 117 P.2d 275
(1941).
73. Comment, supra note 47, at 193-94 n.31 (citing Dunster v. Abbott, 2 All
E.R. 1572 (1953)).
Nova Law Journal
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 7
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss3/7
Liability of Premises Owners6:1982 549 I
the defendant knew of Starling's drunken condition and could foresee
the likelihood of injury resulting. The pier operator was clearly in the
better position to safeguard Starling without danger to himself.
Whether Starling was originally an invitee who became an uninvited
licensee or even a trespasser, is a purely academic question under these
circumstances since the same duty of care should be imposed upon the
pier and its operator.
Prigden v. Boston Housing Authority74 presented the question of
the duty owed a trespasser"5 known to be in a position of peril. After
initially trespassing onto the premises, the child plaintiff was injured
because the property owner failed to take safety precautions even after
the condition of peril was known; the child fell down the elevator shaft
of an apartment building. The agent of the premises owner knew of the
child's position and refused to turn off the power to the elevator. A
third person put the elevator into operation and serious injury resulted
to the child. The court found inapplicable any rule which exempted a
property owner who did not act when he was in a position to act where
he could prevent injury or further injury. The Massachusetts Supreme
Court therefore extended the duty of exercising reasonable care to pre-
vent injury to include the duty to take affirmative action to protect a
trespasser in a known position of peril. Prigden clearly exemplifies the
reason to eliminate different duties of care owed to individuals on an-
other's property. If the Massachusetts court had applied the traditional
common law duty owed to a trespasser, that child would probably have
been barred from recovery.
In 1963, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld a com-
mon duty to all lawful visitors, 7 but would not go as far as California
74. Prigden v. Boston Housing Auth., 364 Mass. 696, 308 N.E.2d 467 (1974).
75. Another example of the duty owed to a trespasser who was intoxicated and
allowed to remain in a place where injury was foreseeable is illustrated in the following
case. An intoxicated passenger of another railroad company was aroused from a
drunken stupor and placed on a depot platform. Shortly thereafter, he was observed by
employees of the defendant company sleeping between the tracks. It was found that the
employees had a duty to either see him safely out of the railroad yard or watch out for
him as the engine moved. The employees did neither and the company was found lia-
ble, even though plaintiff was a trespasser. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. v.
Marrs' Adm'x., 27 Ky. 388, 85 S.W. 188 (1905).
76. Prigden v. Boston Housing Auth., 364 Mass. 696, 697, 308 N.E. 2d 467, 477
(1974).
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had in Rowland v. Christian77 which placed a trespasser in the same
category as licensee and invitee. While the California decision made
status a factor in determining liability, status was not the dispositive
factor.
In Rowland v. Christian, the California Supreme Court advocated
a single duty of reasonable care in all circumstances 78 to replace the
difficult and often arbitrary application of the common law's anachro-
nistic distinctions.
7 9
Whatever may have been the historical justifications for the com-
mon law distinctions, it is clear that these distinctions are not justi-
fied in the light of our modern society and that the complexity and
confusion which has arisen is not due to the difficulty in applying
the original common law rules-they are all too easy to apply in
their original formulation-but is due to the attempts to apply just
rules in our modern society within the ancient terminology.8"
The factors that should be weighed in determining liability or im-
munity may or may not have anything to do with the original classifica-
77. 69 Cal. 2d 180, 184, 443 P.2d 561, 566, 70 Cal. Rptr. 98, 102 (1968).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. In refusing to adopt the rules relating to the liability of a possessor of
land for the law of admiralty, the United States Supreme Court stated:
The distinctions which the common law draws between licensee and invitee
were inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land, a culture which
traced many of its standards to a heritage of feudalism. In an effort to do
justice in an industrialized urban society, with its complex economic and
individual relationships, modern common-law courts have found it neces-
sary to formulate increasingly subtle verbal refinements, to create subclas-
sifications among traditional common-law categories, and to delineate fine
gradations in the standards of care which the landowner owes to each. Yet
even within a single jurisdiction, the classifications and subclassifications
bred by the common law have produced confusion and conflict. As new
distinctions have been spawned, older ones have become obscured.
Through this semantic morass the common law has moved, unevenly and
with hesitation, towards "imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty
of reasonable care in all circumstances."
Id. (footnotes omitted in original). Note also that England has rejected the common
law distinctions in the Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 31.
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tions.81 "[T]o focus upon the status of the injured party as a trespasser,
licensee, or invitee in order to determine whether the landowner has a
duty of care, is contrary to our modern social mores and humanitarian
values."82 Plaintiff's status is relevant insofar as it bears on the deter-
mination of what constitutes reasonable care.83
Whether Starling was an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser, the
pier operator knew of his condition and the likelihood of injury. These
are the gauges which should be used to measure degree of care. The
jury should be asked if "an ordinary reasonable and prudent person
under the same or similar circumstances, stand[ing] in the shoes of the
defendant, could foresee a risk of some harm to the particular
plaintiff?" 8
While Florida has not gone as far as California, and in fact has
expressly repudiated the reasoning that favors discontinuing the classi-
fications, the Starling case demonstrates that the duty owed by an oc-
cupier of premises should be expanded. A jury might well find no liabil-
ity on the part of the pier operator depending upon the jury instructions
given regarding the duty owed to invitees or licensees. If there was a
single duty of care, the status of the injured person would be only a
factor in determining whether the pier operator owed the plaintiff a
duty of ordinary care. It would not only simplify the law, it would
make it manifestly more just.
Conclusion
By finding that a cause of action had been stated, Estate of Star-
ling demonstrated the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal's will-
ingness to expand the liability of premises owners to those who lawfully
come upon the premises.
The facts of this case illustrate the inadequacy of variously classi-
fying persons for purposes of defining premise owners' duty. Neither
the victim's classification nor the voluntariness of his condition should
be the basis of liability. Once a presence is known, if the forseeable
81. 69 Cal. 2d at 187, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
82. Id.
83. Comment, supra note 47 at 199.
84. Id.
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danger is great, while the risk of preventing injury is small, the pier
operator should be under a duty to act.
Roberta Kushner
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